Abstract: We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. A rule on the set of preference pro…les consists of a partition function and a solution. Given a preference pro…le, a partition is selected and as many units of the good as the number of coalitions in the partition are allocated, where each unit is shared among all agents belonging to the same coalition according to the solution. A rule is stable at a preference pro…le if no agent strictly prefers to leave his coalition to join another coalition and all members of the receiving coalition want to admit him. We show that the proportional solution and all sequential dictator solutions admit stable partition functions. We also show that stability is a strong requirement that becomes easily incompatible with other desirable properties like e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, anonymity, and non-envyness.
Introduction
Consider the division problem faced by a set of agents who have to share a unit of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good. For instance, a group of agents participate in an activity that requires a …xed amount of labor measured in units of time. Given a wage, classical monotonic and quasiconcave preferences on the set of bundles of money and leisure generate single-peaked preferences on the set of potential shares, where the best share is the amount of working time associated to the optimal bundle and in both sides of the best share the preference is strictly monotonic, decreasing at its right and increasing at its left. Similarly, a group of agents join a partnership to invest in a project (an indivisible bond with a face value, for example) that requires a …xed amount of money, neither more nor less. Their risk attitudes and wealth induce single-peaked preferences on the amount to be invested. As in the previous examples, there are other social choice settings for which the division problem appears as its reduced problem (see for example, Barberà and Jackson (1995) ).
A solution is a family of mappings that select for each instance of division problem (a set of agents and their single-peaked preferences) a vector of shares, one for each agent. But for most single-peaked preference pro…les, the sum of the best shares will be either larger or smaller than the total amount to be allocated. A positive or negative rationing problem emerges depending on whether the sum of the best shares exceeds or falls short of the …xed amount. Sprumont (1991) started a large literature characterizing solutions in terms of alternative sets of properties. These solutions di¤er on the underlying principles guiding how the rationing problem has to be solved. 1 In this paper we study the division problem when the good to be allocated also comes with …xed amounts but now agents may share several units, whose number is endogenous because it may depend on agents' preferences. Consider for example a group of entrepreneurs examining several business opportunities. Each entrepreneur is willing to devote himself to at most one of those business opportunities and as before, their risk attitudes and wealth induce single-peaked preferences on the amount to be invested. We let agents partition themselves into coalitions in such a way that agents in each coalition will have to share one and only one unit of the good. An allocation is a pair consisting of a partition of the set of agents and a vector of allotments specifying for each coalition in the partition a vector of shares, one for each agent in the coalition, whose components add up to one unit. A rule is a mapping that selects for each pro…le of singlepeaked preferences an allocation; i.e., a partition and a vector of allotments. Thus, a rule can be decomposed into two procedures. For each pro…le of single-peaked preferences, the …rst procedure is a function that selects a partition of the set of agents while the second procedure is a solution to be applied to the subpro…le of single-peaked preferences of the agents in each coalition of the partition. We restrict ourselves to second procedures that select the allotment by means of a unique solution applied to each rationing problem faced by each coalition in the partition. This restriction implies that the same principles are used across coalitions and it can be interpreted as a consistency requirement. Thus, a rule can be identi…ed with a partition function (mapping single-peaked preference pro…les into partitions of the set of agents) and a solution (to be applied to each coalition of the selected partition). 1 For axiomatic characterizations of solutions see for example Barberà, Jackson, and Neme (1997), Ching (1992 Ching ( , 1994 ), Dagan (1996) , Ehlers (2002a Ehlers ( , 2002b , Herrero and Villar (2000) , Schummer and Thomson (1997) , Sönmez (1994) , and Thomson (1994 Thomson ( , 1995 Thomson ( , 1997 Thomson ( , 2003 .
Our main concern in this paper is the stability of rules.
2 Speci…cally, …x a solution. We want to know whether there exists a partition function that, together with the …xed solution, constitute an stable rule. Our notion of stability is based on the principle that the allocations proposed by the rule have to be voluntarily accepted by the agents in the following sense. Consider a rule and a pro…le of single-peaked preferences. Apply the rule to the pro…le, thereby obtaining a partition and a vector of allotments. Take an agent in a coalition and another coalition (which may be empty), and suppose that (1) the agent wants to leave his original coalition to join the other one because the share assigned to him by the solution applied to the subpro…le of preferences of the agents in the new coalition is strictly preferred to his former share, and (2) all agents of the receiving coalition want to admit the agent because the shares assigned to them by the solution applied to the subpro…le of preferences of the agents in the new coalition are weakly preferred to their respective former shares. In this case, the original chosen allocation would be instable at the pro…le to which the rule has been applied. A rule is stable if it chooses stable allocations at each pro…le of single-peaked preferences. Three remarks are in order. First, to generate an instability we are requiring that the moving agent has to obtain an strictly preferred share while the agents of the receiving coalition have to obtain a weakly preferred share. This captures the idea that to move from one coalition to another (the origin of the instability) requires a bit more than just to admit a new member in the coalition. Second, instabilities are generated only by one agent moving to a new coalition. In this case, the needed coordination among agents to ful…ll the instability is minimal compared with the coordination needed if non-singleton subcoalitions would be allowed to change coalitions. Third, the receiving coalition may be empty, in which case the instability would be produced only by the agent that by leaving his current coalition could be strictly better o¤; i.e., the agent would strictly prefer the full share of one unit of the good to the share he had been assigned in his original coalition. In a similar setting Gensemer et al (1996 Gensemer et al ( , 1998 ) study another concept of stability that they call "migration equilibrium". Agents with single-peaked preferences are partitioned into several local economies, each of which has an endowment that is allocated among its participants following a given solution. A migration equilibrium requires that no agent will be better o¤ by leaving his economy to join another. They show that when the solution applied to each local economy is well behaved 3 there might not exist a migration equilibria. Note that the receiving economy cannot ban the arrival of a new agent and hence the migration equilibrium is a stronger stability condition than the one studied in this paper. Which stability condition to apply depends on the applications.
In an environment with a small number of agents with decision power such as in joint ventures, our concept is more appealing whereas for movements across countries or big societies the migration equilibrium is the one to be considered. 2 Kar and Kibris (2008) consider the e¢ ciency of such rules in a setting where the number of units to share is …xed rather than endogenous. They show that for the domain of single-peaked preferences and for well behaved solutions (e¢ cient, non dictatorial, strategy proof, resource monotonic and consistent), it is not possible to …nd a partition such that the …nal allocation is e¢ cient. 3 In particular, in Gensemer et al (1996) they show that a migration equilibrium might fail to exists if the solution applied to the local economies satis…es two of the following three properties: Pareto e¢ ciency, strategy proofness and no-envy. In Gensemer et al (1998) they show that a migration equilibrium might fail to exists whenever the solution applied to the local economies is either the Proportional, the Sequential Dictator, the Uniform or the Egalitarian rules.
We found that in general, …nding partition functions for well-known and simple solutions, to constitute together stable rules, is not an easy task. Indeed, it may become extremely complex in the general setting of the division problem. Thus, we have simpli…ed the problem by assuming that agents' single-peaked preferences are in addition symmetric. 4 A single-peaked preference is symmetric if the following additional condition holds: a share is strictly preferred to another one if and only if the former is strictly closer to the best share. Observe that in many applications the linear order structure on the set of potential shares, relative to which single-peakedness is de…ned, conveys to agents' preferences more than just an ordinal content. Often, an agent's preference on the set of shares is responsive also to the notion of distance, embedding to the preference its corresponding property of symmetry (see Massó and Moreno de Barreda (2011) for the use of symmetric single-peaked preferences in the context of selecting a public good, as in Moulin (1980) ). The use of symmetric single-peaked preferences has the additional advantage that, without loss of generality, the domain of the rule is the set of vectors of best shares, instead of the set of pro…les of full preferences.
Our main results establish that, provided that agents'preferences are symmetric single-peaked, the proportional solution (Proposition 1) and all sequential dictator solutions (Proposition 2) have the property that for each one of them there exists a partition function that, together with the corresponding solution, constitute an stable rule. 5 The proportional solution of the division problem assigns to each agent, given a vector of agents' best shares, a share that is equal to his best share divided by the sum of all the best shares. Remember that the solution is applied to each coalition in the partition selected by the partition function at the vector of agents' best shares. Given an ordering on the set of agents, the sequential dictator solution associated with this ordering, and applied to a vector of agents' best shares, let each agent, except the last one, choose sequentially (following the ordering) his share of what is left of the good (if anything) by his predecessors. The last agent in the ordering gets the remainder. Observe that (i) each ordering on the set of agents de…ne a di¤erent solution of the division problem, and (ii) the order is …xed and used in each of the coalitions selected by the partition function at the same vector of agents'best shares. The proofs of the two results are constructive and proceed by induction on the number of agents. In addition, we exhibit examples showing that for both rules stability is an strong requirement incompatible with many other desirable properties like e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, anonymity, and non-envyness. We also show that there are simple solutions for which there do not exist partition functions that together constitute stable rules. For this purpose we exhibit as example a weighted proportional solution; namely, we show that there is a vector of weights, one for each agent, with the property that the corresponding weighted proportional solution has no partition function that together constitute an stable rule.
Amorós (2002), Adachi (2010) , and Morimoto, Serizawa, and Ching (2013) study also multidimensional extensions of Sprumont (1991)'s division problem. They extend the uniform solution of a division problem to many division problems (Amorós (2002) does it for problems with only 4 Kar and Kibris (2008) show that in the domain of symmetric singled-peaked preferences, and when the number of units of the good to be shared is …xed, whenever a (local) solution is e¢ cient, there exists a partition such that the …nal allocation is e¢ cient. 5 Note that for both the proportional solution and the sequential dictator solution a migration equilibrium [Gensemer et al (1996, 1998) ] might fail to exists even when we restrict the preferences to symmetric single-peaked domain.
two agents). Their approach is di¤erent to ours because they consider problems where the goods to be allocated may be di¤erent and each agent has preferences on vectors of his potential shares (one for each di¤erent good). Their main contribution is to extend and axiomatically characterize the uniform solution to the multiple goods setting. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model. In Section 3 we state and prove our main results. In Section 4 we present some …nal comments.
Preliminaries
Agents are indexed by the elements of a …nite set N = f1; :::; ng, where n 1. They have to partition themselves in such a way that the agents of each coalition of the partition have to share one unit of a perfectly divisible good (as in Sprumont (1991)). Let denote the set of partitions of N . Given = fS 1 ; :::; S K g 2 and i 2 N , let S (i) denote the set S k 2 such that i 2 S k . An allocation is a pair ( ; x) where = fS 1 ; :::; S K g 2 is a partition and x = (x 1 ; :::
n is a vector of allotments such that, for each k = 1; :::; K, X i2S k
Let A be the set of allocations. We assume that each agent i 2 N has a complete, re ‡exive and transitive preference relation R i on the set of his potential shares [0; 1]. Let P i and I i be its associated strict and indi¤erence relations, respectively. Namely, for each pair 
A solution f is a family ff S g S N , where each f S is a solution for S. Given a solution f , a partition , and a pro…le b, denote by f ( ; b) = (f i ( ; b)) i2N the following vector of allotments: for each
A partition function is a mapping : 
We can also apply a rule to a subpro…le in the obvious way.
In the next section we will focus on the stability of some rules. We now de…ne this property. Consider a rule. Given a pro…le, apply the rule to the pro…le, thereby obtaining a partition and a vector of allotments. Now, imagine that an agent moves to another coalition in the partition and, after applying the solution to this new subset, he obtains an strictly better share and all former members of this receiving coalition (which may be empty) are at least as well as they were before. Then, the rule would not be stable at the pro…le. To de…ne formally a stable rule we have to describe, given a partition, an agent and a coalition receiving this agent, the new partition after the agent moves from the former coalition to the new one. Given = fS 1 ; :::; S K g, i 2 N , and k 2 f1; :::; Kg de…ne
Observe that if i = 2 S k then i;k is the new partition where all coalitions remain the same except that S (i) looses i and S k gains i: But if i 2 S k then i;k is the new partition where all coalitions remain the same except that S (i) looses i and fig is itself one of the elements of the partition. n if there do not exist i 2 N and k 2 f1; :::; Kg such that:
Up to now all the de…nitions allowed for each subset S N to have its own distinct solution f S . As we have already said in the Introduction, we restrict our analysis to the case in which a unique solution is applied to every coalition in the partition. This requirement implies that the same principles are used across coalitions and can be interpreted as a consistency requirement.
Stable Rules
In the following subsections we study the stability of rules associated to two well-known solutions: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions.
Proportional Solution
The proportional solution p = fp S g S N is de…ned as follows: for each non-empty subset of agents
otherwise. 6 If there exist i and k such that (1) and (2) hold we say i wants to leave S (i) to join S k and all agents in S k want to admit i.
Proposition 1 There exists a partition function
p such that the rule P = ( p ; p) is stable.
Proof By induction on n. I Assume n = 1. The stability of P = ( p ; p) is obvious.
Induction Hypothesis: For all S with 1 #S < n there exists a partition function S such that ( S ; p = fp T g T S ) is stable.
I
Assume now that b i > 0 for some i 2 N . Take an arbitrary S 1 N with the property that
By the de…nition of S 1 , P (b) is stable at b: Assume now that N nS 1 6 = ? and consider the subpro…le
First, by de…nition of S 1 , for all i 2 S 1 and for any T 2 N nS1 (b N nS1 ),
Then,
Hence, i does not want to leave S 1 to join T . Second, take k 2 N nS 1 . By de…nition of S 1 ,
Notice that the inequality is strict since S 1 has the largest size among all sets in AM . Then, consider any i 2 S 1 such that b i > 0: By the de…nition of S 1 ; there exists at least one agent with this property. Then,
(b S1[fkg ). Hence, i 2 S 1 does not want to admit k 2 N nS 1 in S 1 . Third, by the induction hypothesis, (
is an stable allocation at b N nS1 ; namely, for all S 2 N nS1 (b N nS1 ) and k 2 N nS 1 such that k = 2 S; either k does not want to join S or there is some agent in S that does not want to admit k.
Finally, we check that no agent in S 1 wants to leave and form a singleton coalition; namely, for all i 2 S 1 ; p Then, the weak preference also holds because, by the de…nition of S 1 ;
Hence, P = ( p ; p) is an stable rule.
We …nish this subsection by showing that not all weighted proportional rules are stable. To see that, let w = (w 1 ; :::; w n ) 2 (0; 1) n be a vector of weights such that P i2N w i = 1: The weighted proportional solution wp = fwp S g S N is de…ned as follows: for each non-empty subset of agents
Given a partition function , de…ne the weighted proportional rule as W = ( ; wp).
The following example shows that there are vectors of weights w such that there is no partition function for which the weighted proportional rule W = ( ; wp) is stable. 
Sequential Dictator Solutions
Let : N ! N be a one-to-one mapping de…ning an ordering on the set of agents N ; namely, for i; j 2 N , (i) < (j) means that i goes before j in the ordering : Fix and S 6 = ?: De…ne the sequential dictator solution associated to for S; denoted by 
The sequential dictator solution associated to is the family d = f d Proof Without loss of generality we assume that is such that (i) = i for all i 2 N . In the proof we will omit the reference to the ordering . The proof is by induction on n.
Induction Hypothesis: For all S N with 1 #S < n; there exists a partition function
with the property that # S #S for all S 2 AM : Hence, if b j = 0 then,
We will consider the following cases:
By the induction hypothesis the allocation
We want to show that
Since v b n ; for all j < n; d
namely, j does not want to leave the setŜ [ fng = N: We will show that n does not want to leave N either. Assume the contrary,
By the hypothesis of Case 1 and (2), Assume now that N n(Ŝ [ fng) 6 = ?: We distinguish between the following two subcases. Subcase 1.1:
Then, dŜ
[fng n (bŜ [fng ) = 0 and for all i 2Ŝ;
First, by (4) and the induction hypothesis, no agent inŜ wants to leaveŜ. Moreover, by the hypothesis of Case 1 and (2), b n 1 2 and hence, n does not want to leaveŜ [ fng and to form a singleton coalition.
Second, take any j 2 N n(Ŝ [ fng). Observe that j < n. Then, since
By the induction hypothesis, the allocation
Hence, and sinceŜ 2 N nfng and j = 2Ŝ; either there exists i 2Ŝ such that
Thus, by (4) and (5), either
Namely, either j is not admitted inŜ [ fng or else j does not want to leave S N nfng (j) to join S [ fng.
Third, take any T 2 d;N (b)n(Ŝ [ fng) and consider the coalition T [ fng. If
(bŜ [fng ) = 0 and n does not want to leaveŜ[fng to join T . If
. Thus, n does not want to leaveŜ [ fng to join T .
Subcase 1.2:
P i2Ŝ b i < 1. Notice that, by the de…nition ofŜ, for all S 2 N nfng ,
First, take
Using the fact that, by the induction hypothesis, j and S did not generate an instability in the allocation ( N nfng ; d N nfng (b N nfng )) we will show that j andŜ [ fng do not generate an instability in the allocation
otherwise, j does not want to leave S 0 . By (6),
By the stability of the allocation (
or else there must exist i 0 2Ŝ such that
If (9) holds then, by (8) ,
namely, j does not want to leave S 0 to joinŜ [ fng: Assume (9) does not hold; i:e: j wants lo leave S 0 to joinŜ. Then, (10) holds. Assume that j wants to leave S 0 to joinŜ [ fng; that is,
Then, by (10) , (8) and dŜ
Thus, i 0 does not want to admit j in the coalitionŜ [ fng:
Assume …rst that j is not the last inŜ [ fjg: Then, dŜ
Let j = max i2Ŝ i > j: For all i 2Ŝnfj g;
Moreover, since dŜ j (bŜ) = 1
Conditions (12), (13), and (14) imply that j wants to leave S 0 to joinŜ and all agents inŜ want to admit j; contradicting that (
is an stable allocation.
Assume now that j is the last inŜ[fjg: Hence, for all i 2Ŝ; dŜ and j and j we will get a contradiction of the stability of (
Observe that this can be done since b j = 0 and
We want to check that n does not want to leavê S [ fng to join T . Since, by de…nition ofŜ;
where the strict inequality follows because otherwise, if dŜ
a contradiction with the hypothesis of Subcase 1.2 stating that P i2Ŝ b i < 1: Thus, by singlepeakedness, dŜ
. Hence, n does not want to leaveŜ [ fng to join coalition T .
Third, we show that n does not want to leaveŜ [ fng to form a singleton coalition. Assume otherwise; i.e.,
otherwise, if
To obtain a contradiction, suppose that
is not an stable allocation. By (16) , for all i 6 = n; d
Hence, it has to be agent n who wants to leave N to form a singleton coalition; that is, d
a contradiction with (2). Thus assume that S ( N: By the induction hypothesis,
is stable, we …rst check that n does not want to leave S to form a singleton coalition. Assume otherwise; then, by (16) , j1 b n j < 1 P i2 Snfng b i b n = v; a contradiction with (2) . We now distinguish between the following two subcases. Subcase 2.1:
where the …rst strict inequality holds because by (1), j = 2 S implies b j > 0 and v = P i2 S b i 1 implies that 1
. Hence, n does not want to admit j in S: Second, by (16) 
Hence, no agent in Snfng wants to leave S to join any other coalition. To see that stability and anonymity or envy-freeness are incompatible, let N = f1; 2g; (1) = 1, (2) = 2 and consider the pro…le b = (0:6; 0:6). Then, the stable allocation (f1; 2g; (0:6; 0:4)) is stable but the two agents have the same best-shares, receive a di¤erent share and agent 2 envies agent 1. Finally, the allocation (ff1g; f2gg; (1; 1)) is not stable since 1 wants to join f2g and 2 wants to admit 1.
Second, and based on simulations, we conjecture that there exist stable rules associated to the uniform and the equal gain-losses solutions.
Third, it is possible to show that the following result holds. Let f be an e¢ cient solution; then, there exists a partition function ef such that ( ef ; f ) is e¢ cient. 7 However, ( ef ; f ) may not be stable.
